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 2 
Parties to arbitration agreements sometimes invoke the 
judicial system to litigate collateral issues arising out of the 
arbitration process, such as arbitrability of some or all of the 
claims, arbitrator bias, and award enforcement or vacatur.  When 
deciding these collateral issues arising out of securities arbitration, 
courts interpret and apply the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”).1  
This chapter identifies recent decisions by the Supreme Court 
under the FAA, as well as selected lower court decisions that could 
have an impact on securities arbitration practice. 
 
I. U.S. Supreme Court  
 
 Since PLI published the Arbitration Law Update 2011 last 
June, the United States Supreme Court decided three new 
arbitration cases, two on arbitrability and one on FAA preemption.  
The Court also dismissed a writ of certiorari in one other case that 
it had appeared ready to decide. 
 
A. Arbitrability 
 
1. Arbitrability of claims in multi-claim action 
 
 In KPMG LLP v. Cocchi,
2
 in a per curiam opinion, the 
Court held that, when faced with a motion to compel arbitration of 
a multi-claim lawsuit, courts must compel arbitration of those 
claims that are arbitrable even if they find that other claims in the 
lawsuit are not arbitrable.  In that case, a group of limited 
partnership investors sued (among others) the auditor KPMG, 
alleging it failed to use proper auditing standards when auditing 
                                                 
1
 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. (2010).  Because securities arbitration necessarily 
“involves commerce” (FAA § 2), courts apply the FAA to issues arising 
out of securities arbitrations.  See Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 
537 U.S. 79 (2002). 
2
 132 S.Ct. 23 (2011). 
 3 
the financial statements of the limited partnerships.
3
  The investors 
pled in their complaint four distinct causes of action: negligent 
misrepresentation, professional malpractice, aiding and abetting a 
breach of fiduciary duty, and violation of the Florida Deceptive 
and Unfair Trade Practices Act.  KPMG moved to compel 
arbitration of all four claims, citing the arbitration clauses in the 
auditor services agreement with the partnerships.
4
   
 
 The trial court denied the motion to compel, and the 
Florida District Court of Appeal affirmed, even though its opinion 
suggests that it concluded that only two of the four claims 
(negligent misrepresentation and the Florida statutory claim) were 
nonarbitrable.
5
   According to the Supreme Court, the Florida 
appellate court’s opinion “indicates a likelihood that [it] failed to 
determine whether the other two claims in the complaint 
[professional malpractice and aiding and abetting a breach of 
fiduciary duty] were arbitrable.”6  The Court stated, “when a 
complaint contains both arbitrable and nonarbitrable claims, the 
Act requires courts to ‘compel arbitration of pendent arbitrable 
claims when one of the parties files a motion to compel, even 
where the result would be the possibly inefficient maintenance of 
separate proceedings in different forums.’”7  Thus, the Supreme 
Court remanded the case back to the Florida Court of Appeal to 
                                                 
3
 Id. at 24.  The three partnerships at issue were invested with Bernard 
Madoff, and ultimately lost millions of dollars.  Id. 
4
 Id. at 25.  The arbitration clause provided that “’[a]ny dispute or claim 
arising out of or relating to ... the services provided [by KPMG] ... 
(including any dispute or claim involving any person or entity for whose 
benefit the services in question are or were provided) shall be resolved’ 
either by mediation or arbitration.”  Id. (citing audit services agreement). 
5
 Id. at 25. 
6
 Id. at 24. 
7
 Id. at 26, citing Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 217 
(1985). 
 4 
determine whether the remaining two claims should be sent to 
arbitration.
8
  
 
 While this holding may seem unremarkable, one aspect of 
the Cocchi decision raises concern.  The Cocchi Court heavily 
cited from Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd,
9
 in which it held 
that a federal district court must compel arbitration of pendent state 
law claims even if the court asserts jurisdiction over the federal 
law claims.  The Cocchi Court quoted the Byrd Court’s citation to 
§§3 and 4 of the FAA and the proposition that “’the Act leaves no 
place for the exercise of discretion by a district court, but instead 
mandates that district courts shall direct the parties to proceed to 
arbitration on issues as to which an arbitration agreement has been 
signed.’”10   
 
 However, the Supreme Court has never held expressly that 
any section of the FAA other than §2 applies in state court, yet it 
justified its holding in Cocchi based on the language of FAA §§3 
and 4, which presumably did not apply in the Florida state courts.  
Byrd came to the Supreme Court through the federal courts, not 
state courts, and thus, in that case, the district court and ultimately 
the Supreme Court properly applied §§3 and 4 of the FAA.  By 
citing to this aspect of the Byrd Court’s holding, the Cocchi Court 
may have suggested (incorrectly, in my view) that FAA §§3 and 4 
apply in state court. 
 
2. Arbitrability of federal statutory claims 
 
 The Supreme Court also addressed the arbitrability of 
federal statutory claims in the past year.  Since its watershed 
                                                 
8
 Id. at 26. 
9
 470 U.S. 213 (1985). 
10
 Cocchi,132 S.Ct. at 25-26 (quoting Byrd, 470 U.S. at 218) (emphasis in 
original). 
 5 
decision in Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon
11
 that 
federal securities law claims are arbitrable, the Supreme Court has 
held consistently that claims arising under federal statutes are 
arbitrable as a matter of public policy. 
 
  Its January 2012 decision in CompuCredit Corp. v. 
Greenwood 
12
 was no exception.  In CompuCredit, the Court 
resolved a circuit split and held that claims arising under the Credit 
Repair Organizations Act
13
 are arbitrable.  The Ninth Circuit had 
decided in the opinion below that Congress intended to preclude 
arbitration of claims arising under the CROA, a consumer 
protection statute, when it provided consumers with a “right to 
sue” violators of prohibitions in the statute.14  Because that Ninth 
Circuit decision conflicted with opinions from the Third and 
Eleventh Circuits, the Supreme Court agreed to resolve the circuit 
split.   
 
 The Court, in a 6-3 majority opinion authored by Justice 
Scalia, concluded that the CROA’s requirement that credit repair 
organizations notify consumers that they “have a right to sue a 
credit repair organization that violates the Credit Repair 
Organization Act” does not reflect Congressional intent to 
preclude arbitration of claims arising under the Act.
15
  The Court 
similarly concluded that the Act’s nonwaiver provision does not 
preclude the enforcement of an arbitration agreement that waives 
the right to bring CROA claims in court.
16
  These provisions did 
                                                 
11
 482 U.S. 220 (1987). 
12
 132 S.Ct. 665 (2012). 
13
 15 U.S.C. § 1679 et seq.(“CROA”). 
14
 Greenwood v. CompuCredit Corp., 615 F.3d 1204, 1206-07 (9th Cir. 
2010). 
15
 CompuCredit,132 S.Ct. at 669-70. 
16
 Id. at 670-71.   
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not create a consumer’s right to bring a CROA claim in court; it 
only created a consumer’s right to receive the statutory notice.17 
 
 What is notable about this decision is that consumers 
pursue many claims arising under the CROA in class actions, as 
they typically are too small for consumers to bring them 
individually.  Combined with the Court’s endorsement of class 
action waivers of consumer protection claims in AT&T Mobility, 
LLC v. Concepcion,
18
 CompuCredit could eliminate the ability of 
many consumers to vindicate their CROA statutory rights.  
 
B. FAA Preemption 
 
 Another consistent holding in the Supreme Court’s FAA 
jurisprudence is that FAA §2 – which declares that agreements to 
arbitrate are “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such 
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any 
contract”19 – preempts state laws that place an arbitration 
agreement on unequal footing from other contracts.
20
 
 
 In February 2012, in a per curiam opinion, the Court yet 
again held that the FAA preempted a state law.  In Marmet Health 
Care Center, Inc. v. Brown,
21
 the Court ruled that the FAA 
preempted a West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals rule that 
voided as against public policy pre-dispute arbitration clauses in 
nursing home contracts with respect to negligence claims.  
Specifically, the West Virginia high court had held in Brown v. 
                                                 
17
 Id. 
18
 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).  See infra Part II.A. 
19
 9 U.S.C. §2.  The latter phrase of this section is known as the FAA’s 
“savings clause.” 
20
 See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740 (2011); 
Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346 (2008).   
21
 132 S.Ct. 1201 (2012). 
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Genesis Healthcare Corp.
22
 that, “as a matter of public policy 
under West Virginia law, an arbitration clause in a nursing home 
admission agreement adopted prior to an occurrence of negligence 
that results in a personal injury or wrongful death, shall not be 
enforced to compel arbitration of a dispute concerning the 
negligence.”23  The West Virginia court attempted to distinguish 
the Supreme Court’s line of FAA preemption cases by carving out 
an exception for negligence claims deriving from personal injury 
or wrongful death. 
  
 The Supreme Court easily dispensed with the West 
Virginia high court’s reading of the FAA, reiterating that the FAA 
displaces any state law that outright prohibits the arbitration of a 
particular type of claim.
24
  However, the Court carefully carved out 
an option for the state court to apply a contract-neutral state 
unconscionability doctrine to void the arbitration agreement.  “On 
remand, the West Virginia court must consider whether, absent 
that general public policy [declaring arbitration clauses in nursing 
home contracts unenforceable for negligence claims], the 
arbitration clauses in Brown's case and Taylor's case are 
unenforceable under state common law principles that are not 
specific to arbitration and pre-empted by the FAA.”25 
 
C. Waiver 
 
 Last term, it appeared the Court was poised to interpret the 
scope of the waiver defense in arbitration: a claim that one party to 
an arbitration clause has waived its right to arbitrate based on 
                                                 
22
 __ S.E.2d __, 2011 WL 2611327 (W.Va. June 29, 2011). 
23
 Marmet, 132 S.Ct. at 1203, citing Brown v. Genesis Healthcare Corp., 
__ S.E.2d __, 2011 WL 2611327 (W.Va. June 29, 2011), App. to Pet. for 
Cert. in No. 11–391, pp. 85a–86a. 
24
 Marmet,132 S.Ct. at 1203-04. 
25
 Id. at 1204. 
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conduct in parallel litigation.
26
  In Stok & Associates, P.A. v. 
Citibank, N.A,
27
 the Court had agreed to resolve a circuit split over 
whether prejudice is a required element of the waiver defense or 
just another factor for courts to consider.
28
  In the opinion below, 
the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that Citibank had 
not waived its right to arbitrate a claim brought by Stok & 
Associates, P.A., because Stok did not make the required showing 
of prejudice.
29
  However, the Court never got a chance to decide 
the issue, as the parties settled their dispute as the 2011-12 term 
began and the Court dismissed the writ of certiorari.
30
 
 
II. Notable Lower Court Decisions  
 
A. FAA Preemption and the fallout from AT&T 
Mobility, LLC  
 
 One year has now passed since the Supreme Court’s 
seminal April 2011decision in AT&T Mobility, LLC v. 
                                                 
26
 While the waiver test varies slightly among the federal circuits, courts 
typically consider factors such as: (1) the time elapsed from 
commencement of litigation to the request for arbitration; (2) the amount 
and nature of litigation, including substantive motions and discovery; and 
(3) prejudice to the party opposing arbitration.  See, e.g., Nat’l Union Fire 
Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, P.A. v. NCR Corp., 376 Fed. Appx. 70, 71 (2d Cir. 
2010).  A recent D.C. Circuit decision illustrates the vitality of the waiver 
defense.  Zuckerman Spaeder, LLP v. Auffenberg, 646 F.3d 919, 924 
(D.C. Cir. 2011) (“By this opinion we alert the bar in this Circuit that 
failure to invoke arbitration at the first available opportunity will 
presumptively extinguish a client's ability later to opt for arbitration.”). 
27
 131 S. Ct. 1556 (2011). 
28
 See generally Brief Opposing Writ of Certiorari, Stok & Assocs. P.A. 
v. Citibank N.A., 2011 WL 63537, *7-14 (Jan. 5,  2011) (explaining that 
a majority of circuits (nine) required a showing of prejudice, and a 
minority of circuits (three) did not). 
29
 Citibank, N.A. v. Stok & Associates, P.A., 387 Fed. Appx. 921 (11th 
Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 1556 (2011). 
30
 Stok & Assoc., 131 S.Ct. 2955 (2011). 
 9 
Concepcion,
31
 in which it held that the FAA preempts California’s 
Discover Bank rule, which “classif[ied] most collective-arbitration 
waivers in consumer contracts as unconscionable.”32  Arbitration 
law scholars and practitioners expressed immediate concern that 
the decision would preclude consumers from pursuing individual, 
low dollar value claims in any forum.   
 
In fact, numerous decisions from states’ high courts post-
AT&T Mobility reflect unyielding FAA preemption of state law 
with respect to the enforceability of arbitration agreements 
containing class action waivers.
33
  Likewise, Professor Sternlight’s 
analysis of federal court reaction in the six months after the case 
revealed that most decisions applied the AT&T Mobility holding 
rigorously, despite there being ample grounds for distinction from 
AT&T Mobility.
34
   
 
                                                 
31
 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).  For a detailed discussion of the case, see Jill I. 
Gross, Arbitration Case Law Update 2011, in SECURITIES ARBITRATION 
2011, at 205 (Practising Law Institute 2011). 
32
 AT&T Mobility, 131 S.Ct. at 1746. 
33
 See, e.g., State of W.Va., ex rel. Richmond Amer. Homes of W. Va., 
Inc. v. Sanders, 228 W.Va. 125 (2011) (upholding class action waiver in 
arbitration clause under AT&T Mobility but declaring clause 
unconscionable on other grounds); NAACP of Camden County East v. 
Foulke Mgmt. Corp., 421 N.J. Super. 404 (2011) (upholding class action 
waiver but denying motion to compel arbitration on ground that 
arbitration provisions lacked mutual assent). 
34
 See Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion 
Impedes Access to Justice, __ OREGON L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2012), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1924365, at 6 (concluding that 
“most courts are rejecting all potential distinctions and are instead 
applying Concepcion broadly as a get out of class actions free card”); see, 
e.g., Litmanv. Cellco Partnership, 655 F.3d 225 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding 
that New Jersey law voiding as unconscionable class action waivers in 
consumer agreements was preempted by the FAA); Kilgore v. KeyBank 
Nat. Ass’n, __ F.3d __, 2012 WL 718344 (9th Cir. Mar. 7, 2012) (holding 
that the FAA preempts the California doctrine [“Broughton/Cruz”] 
prohibiting the arbitration of claims for broad, public injunctive relief). 
 10 
However, a few federal courts have been more willing to 
distinguish AT&T Mobility, and strike down a class action waiver 
under the "vindicating statutory rights" doctrine.
35
  Under this 
doctrine, derived from the Supreme Court’s pronouncement in 
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.
36
 that 
“so long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate its 
statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the [federal] statute 
[providing that cause of action] will continue to serve both its 
remedial and deterrent function,”37 a disputant can argue that an 
arbitration agreement is unenforceable because an unfair aspect of 
the arbitration process would preclude that party from vindicating 
its statutory rights.
38
   
 
For example, in In Re American Express Merchants’ 
Litigation,
39
 a purported class action arising under the federal 
antitrust laws, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reconsidered, 
in light of AT&T Mobility, its prior decisions that a class action 
waiver clause in a credit card agreement was unenforceable under 
the FAA
40
 because “enforcement of the clause would effectively 
                                                 
35
 E.g., Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., No. 10 Civ. 6950 (LBS) 
(JCF), 2011 WL 2671813 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2011) (in a Title VII action, 
distinguishing AT&T Mobility and refusing to reconsider its holding that 
an arbitration clause was unenforceable because plaintiffs would not be 
able to vindicate their statutory rights absent the availability of class 
proceedings). 
36
 473 U.S. 614 (1985). 
37
 Id. at 637. 
38
 See Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 92 (2000) 
(recognizing in dicta that, if a party showed that pursuing its statutory 
claims through arbitration would be prohibitively expensive, and thus it 
could not vindicate its statutory rights, a court could validly refuse to 
enforce a pre-dispute arbitration agreement). 
39
 667 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2012) (“Amex III”). 
40
 See In Re American Exp. Merch. Litig., 634 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2011) 
(“Amex II”); In Re American Exp. Merch. Litig., 554 F.3d 300 (2d Cir. 
2009) (“Amex I”).  The Court of Appeals reconsidered Amex I in light of 
the Supreme Court’s subsequent ruling in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. 
AnimalFeeds Intern. Corp, 130 S.Ct. 1758 (2010). 
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preclude any action seeking to vindicate the [plaintiffs’] statutory 
rights.”41  The Court of Appeals found that AT&T Mobility did not 
alter its prior analysis, which rested on a different ground than that 
of AT&T Mobility.
42
  Rather, the Court of Appeals recognized, 
“[h]ere…our holding rests squarely on a ‘vindication of statutory 
rights analysis, which is part of the federal substantive law of 
arbitrability.’”43  Because plaintiffs in this case demonstrated, 
through expert testimony, that pursuing their statutory claims 
individually as opposed to through class arbitration would not be 
economically feasible, “effectively depriving plaintiffs of the 
statutory protections of the antitrust laws,”44 the Court of Appeals 
directed the district court to deny defendant’s motion to compel 
arbitration.
45
 
   
 Litigants, including administrative agencies tasked with 
enforcing consumer and investor protection laws and regulations, 
are struggling to find legal means other than the vindicating rights 
doctrine to counteract the overpowering preemptive force of the 
FAA.  One possible argument is that other federal statutes may 
trump the FAA and thus limit FAA preemption.  For example, the 
                                                 
41
 Amex I, 554 F.3d at 304. 
42
 Amex III, 667 F.3d at 214 (“What Stolt-Nielsen and Concepcion do not 
do is require that all class-action waivers be deemed per se enforceable.  
That leaves open the question presented on this appeal: whether a 
mandatory class action waiver clause is enforceable even if the plaintiffs 
are able to demonstrate that the practical effect of enforcement would be 
to preclude their ability to bring federal antitrust claims.”). 
43
 Id. at 213, citing Amex I, 554 F.3d at 320. 
44
 Id. at 217. 
45
 Id. at 219; see also Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP, __ F.Supp.2d __, 
10 Civ. 3332, Slip Copy, 2012 WL 130420 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2012) 
(reaffirming an earlier invalidation of an employment agreement waiver 
that would have precluded putative FLSA collective litigation).  A 
complete analysis of the broader impact of AT&T Mobility and the 
continued vitality of the “vindicating rights” doctrine is beyond the scope 
of this article.  Suffice it to say that the issues are complex, far from 
settled and unpredictably working their way through the courts.   
 12 
National Labor Relations Board recently concluded that federal 
labor law bars class action waivers in labor and employment 
contracts.
46
  Similarly, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934’s 
(SEA) anti-waiver provision may prevent the enforcement of a 
class arbitration waiver in the securities context.
47
   
 
At least one broker-dealer, FINRA member Charles 
Schwab & Co., Inc. (“Schwab”), contends that the AT&T Mobility 
doctrine applies in the securities context, and, in October 2011, 
amended its customer agreement to add a class action waiver to the 
arbitration clause.
48
  The waiver clause forces customers to 
agree not to bring or participate in class actions or 
class arbitrations against Schwab.  Instead, they must bring their 
claims “solely in individual capacities.”49 
  
In response, in early 2012, FINRA Enforcement filed a 
disciplinary action against Schwab for including the class action 
waiver.
50
  FINRA charges that requiring customers to waive their 
right to bring or participate in a class action violates NASD Rule 
3110(f)(4)(A) and (C), and its successor rules FINRA Rule 
2268(d)(1) and (3) (effective Dec. 5, 2011).  Those rules prohibit 
member firms from placing “any condition” in a pre-dispute 
arbitration agreement that “limits or contradicts the rules of any 
                                                 
46
 See D.R. Horton, Inc. and Michael Cuda, 357 NLRB No. 184 (Jan. 3, 
2012). 
47
 See Barbara Black, Arbitration of Investors’ Claims Against Issuers: 
An Idea Whose Time Has Come? 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 107, 126-
27 (2012). 
48
 SECURITIES ARBITRATION ALERT 2011-38 (Oct. 12, 2011) (reporting 
that Schwab inserted a new clause entitled “Waiver of Class Action or 
Representative Action” in its Customer Account Agreements). 
49
 Id. 
50
 Complaint and Request for Expedited Hearing, Department of 
Enforcement v. Charles Schwab & Co., Inc., Disc. Proc. No. 
2011029760201, available at 
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@enf/@ad/documents/ind
ustry/p125516.pdf (FINRA Office of Hearing Officers Feb. 1, 2012). 
 13 
self-regulatory organization,” and “limits the ability of a party to 
file any claim in court permitted to be filed in court under the rules 
of the forums in which a claim may be filed under the agreement,” 
respectively.  FINRA argues that, because Rule 12204(d) of the 
FINRA Code of Arbitration Procedure for Customer Disputes 
addresses the manner in which customers can bring and participate 
in class actions against member firms,
51
 the forum rules clearly 
permit class actions, and Schwab’s class action waiver contradicts 
Rule 12204.
52
 
To attempt to moot the FINRA enforcement action, 
Schwab simultaneously filed an action in the U.S. District Court 
for the Northern District of California
53
 seeking a declaratory 
judgment that FINRA “may not enforce its rules regulating broker-
dealers in a manner inconsistent with the Federal Arbitration Act 
as most recently interpreted by [the Court’s decisions in AT&T 
Mobility and CompuCredit].”54  In its complaint, Schwab argues 
that the FAA trumps FINRA’s rules and “the FAA requires 
enforcement of class action waivers absent a Congressional 
command to the contrary.”55  However, Schwab acknowledges that 
FINRA’s rules have the “force of federal law” as they are derived 
from the SEA.
56
  As Professor Barbara Black pointed out, 
                                                 
51
 Likewise, Rule 13204 precludes arbitration of intra-industry class 
action disputes.  See Gomez v. Brill Secs., Inc., 2012 WL 851644 (N.Y. 
App. Div., 1
st
 Dept. Mar. 15, 2012) (refusing to compel arbitration of, 
inter alia, labor law claims by brokerage firm employees that were 
subject of putative class action). 
52
 Id. 
53
 Charles Schwab & Co., Inc. v. FINRA, Complaint for Declaratory and 
Preliminary and Permanent Injunctive Relief, CV 12-0518 (EDL) (N.D. 
Cal. Feb. 1, 2012), available at 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/files/schwab-complaint.pdf.  
Interestingly, Schwab offered to pay its customers’ arbitration filing fees 
pending the outcome of its suit. 
54
 Id., “Introduction,” p. 2, lines 6-9. 
55
 Id., ¶32. 
56
 Id., ¶33. 
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“Schwab fails to acknowlege [sic] (much less address) the 
argument that the Securities Exchange Act and its anti-waiver 
clause preempt the FAA.”57 
Professor Black also updated the procedural status of 
Schwab’s case:  
On Feb. 21, 2012 Schwab filed a motion for 
preliminary injunction, reasserting its arguments. On Feb. 
22, FINRA in turn filed a Motion to Dismiss for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction, asserting as its principal 
argument that Schwab failed to exhaust its administrative 
remedies under the Exchange Act. The Exchange Act 
establishes a comprehensive system of regulating broker-
dealers, including judicial review of FINRA disciplinary 
proceedings. Noting the Schwab instituted this judicial 
proceeding within hours after the disciplinary complaint 
was served, FINRA argues that Schwab failed to meet the 
prerequisite for filing a federal law suit -- exhaustion of its 
administrative remedies.  Moreover, Schwab does 
not assert valid reasons for bypassing the disciplinary 
proceeding -- either that the disciplinary proceeding is too 
time-consuming or that the FINRA and SEC adjudicators 
lack the expertise to address issues outside of securities 
law or FINRA rules.
58
 
 It will be interesting to see whether and how Schwab 
defends against the disciplinary action, as it does appear that the 
class action waiver provision conflicts with Rule 12204(d).  
Moreover, in Schwab’s declaratory judgment action, the district 
court should reject the FAA preemption argument here because (1) 
                                                 
57
 Barbara Black, “FINRA Seeks to Dismiss Schwab’s Lawsuit 
Contesting its Rule Prohibiting Class Action Waivers,” Securities Law 
Prof Blog (Feb. 23, 2012).   
58
 Id. 
 15 
FINRA’s Rules are federal law, and FAA preemption operates 
only to preempt conflicting state law; and (2) the SEA trumps the 
FAA here under the doctrine of implied repeal.
59
 
 In addition to applying the Supreme Court’s latest FAA 
pronouncements, the federal courts have been busy resolving other 
issues arising out of arbitration agreements and proceedings.  The 
rest of this article will highlight a few of these important decisions 
over the past year. 
B. Defenses to Arbitrability 
 
 Litigation about arbitration often results when one party to 
a purported arbitration agreement seeks to compel a reluctant party 
to arbitrate a dispute.  In response to the motion to compel, the 
reluctant party can raise several defenses to the arbitrability of the 
dispute, including the absence of an enforceable arbitration 
agreement (due to contract law doctrines or, in FINRA arbitration, 
the claimant is not a “customer” of respondent), waiver and 
release.  Discussed below are some recent federal court of appeals 
decisions interpreting these defenses. 
 
1. Was there an enforceable arbitration 
agreement? 
 
 Before a court will grant a motion to compel arbitration 
under the FAA, it must be satisfied that the disputing parties 
entered into a valid and enforceable arbitration agreement.  The 
Sixth Circuit held that distributing an employee handbook to new 
employees that mentions a dispute resolution program does not 
                                                 
59
 See Black, supra note 47. 
 16 
constitute a binding arbitration agreement, due to lack of mutual 
assent.
60
   
 
 However, even if parties did not directly enter into an 
arbitration agreement, they may still be able to compel arbitration 
of claims arising out of an arbitration agreement between 
signatories.  A nonsignatory can compel arbitration of related 
claims if the claimant alleges the nonsignatory acted as an agent of 
a signatory.
61
  Under those circumstances, the alleged agents may 
“invoke the benefit of an arbitration agreement executed by their 
principal even though the agents are not parties to the 
agreement.”62 
  
2. Who is a “customer” under FINRA Rule 
12200? 
 
In a FINRA customer-initiated arbitration, in the absence 
of a pre-dispute arbitration clause, respondents may resist 
arbitration on the ground that the claimant is not a “customer” of 
the FINRA member firm within the meaning of FINRA Code of 
Arbitration Procedure for Customer Disputes Rule 12200.  That 
rule provides that a FINRA member firm must arbitrate a claim if 
“requested by a customer,” “[t]he dispute is between a customer 
and a member or associated person of a member; and [t]he dispute 
arises in connection with the business activities of the member or 
the associated person . . . .”63 
 
The Second Circuit decided two cases in the past year 
interpreting FINRA Rule 12200 with opposite outcomes.  In the 
                                                 
60
 See Hergenreder v. Bickford Senior Living Group, Inc., 656 F.3d 411 
(6
th
 Cir. 2011). 
61
 See Thomas v. Westlake, __ Cal. Rptr. 3d __, 2012 WL 974890 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 4
th
 Dist. Mar. 23, 2012). 
62
 Id. at *5. 
63
 FINRA R. 12200. 
 17 
first case, the Second Circuit decided that an issuer who purchases 
auction-facilitating services for its auction rate securities from a 
broker-dealer is a “customer” of that broker-dealer within the 
meaning of FINRA Rule 12200.
64
   In the second case, the Court of 
Appeals ruled that a hedge fund was not a “customer” of a bank/ 
broker-dealer for purposes of a dispute arising out of a credit 
default swap transaction.
65
 
 
In the closely-watched first case, in which both the Public 
Investors Arbitration Bar Association and the Securities Industry 
and Financial Markets Association filed amici briefs, the Court of 
Appeals seemingly opened the door to other disputants who have 
business relationships with FINRA member firms that are not 
necessarily investment or brokerage relationships to pursue claims 
arising out of their relationship in FINRA arbitration. 
 
WVUH is a not-for-profit health consortium that issues 
bonds to finance capital improvements and other needs.  In the 
2000s, it issued several bond offerings (totaling $329 million) 
structured as auction-rate securities (ARS), where the bonds’ 
interest rate is set by periodic Dutch auction.
66
  UBS Financial 
Services served as both the lead underwriter and the broker-dealer 
responsible for setting up the auctions.
67
  After the market for ARS 
collapsed in 2008, WVUH filed a FINRA arbitration claim against 
UBS alleging fraud in connection with its disclosures about the 
ARS market.
68
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UBS took the position that WVUH was not its “customer” 
under FINRA Rule 12200, and thus it did not have to submit to 
arbitration on these claims.  It sought an injunction from the 
district court, which was denied.
69
  On appeal, the Second Circuit 
affirmed, and construed FINRA’s Rule 12200 broadly, as it held 
that a “customer” is not limited to an investor utilizing investment 
or brokerage services of a broker-dealer, but includes any entity 
that purchases any services from the broker-dealer.
70
 
 
In the second case, decided five weeks later, Wachovia 
Bank and its affiliated registered broker-dealer Wachovia Capital 
Markets (WCM) sought to enjoin a FINRA arbitration brought by 
the hedge fund VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund against it 
for damages stemming from a credit default swap (CDS) 
transaction gone sour.
71
  WCM argued that VCG was not its 
“customer” under FINRA Rule 12200 because it was not a party to 
the CDS agreements nor had any of its employees negotiated those 
agreements.  The district court rejected that argument and ordered 
the parties to arbitration.
72
 
 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that 
VCG was not a “customer” of WCM in the disputed transaction.  
Distinguishing WVUH, the Second Circuit found that the 
undisputed facts established that there was no brokerage agreement 
between VCG and WCM, no employee of WCM negotiated the 
CDS transaction with VCG, and no WCM employee 
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recommended the transaction to VCG.
73
  The Court stated “where 
the parties to the relevant agreements and transactions have 
expressly disclaimed any sort of advisory, brokerage or other 
fiduciary relationship, there is no need to grapple with the precise 
boundaries of the FINRA meaning of ‘customer.’”74  
 
3. Waiver 
 
Along with the issue of whether prejudice is a required 
element of the waiver defense (see supra, Part I.C), a federal 
appeals court considered whether a litigant’s filing of an amended 
complaint revives the opposing party’s previously waived right to 
compel arbitration.  In Krinsk v. SunTrust Banks, Inc.,
75
 the 
Eleventh Circuit decided this question as a matter of first 
impression.   
 
In Krinsk, a borrower brought a class action against her 
lender alleging violations of the Truth in Lending Act and other 
state laws after the bank terminated her home equity line of credit.  
After participating for more than six months in the litigation by, 
inter alia, moving to dismiss the complaint, jointly filing a Case 
Manangement Report, and opposing a class certification motion, 
the bank responded to plaintiffs’ filing of an Amended Complaint 
by moving to compel arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause 
in the parties’ loan agreement.  The district court denied the bank’s 
motion to compel arbitration, holding that the bank had waived its 
right to arbitration by litigating the original complaint.
76
 
 
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the order denying 
the motion to compel arbitration.  Following other circuits that had 
addressed this issue, the Court of Appeals held as a matter of first 
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impression that the filing of an amended complaint can revive a 
previously-waived right to compel arbitration if the new pleading 
“unexpectedly changes the scope or theory of the plaintiff’s 
claims.”77  Since the amended complaint here was a “vast 
augmentation of the putative class” and an “unforeseen alteration 
in the shape of the class,” the bank “should have been allowed to 
rescind its earlier waiver through its prompt motion to compel 
litigation.”78  
 
Plaintiff’s counsel beware – think twice before amending a 
complaint if you want to remain in court and you are relying on 
defendant’s prior waiver of its purported right to compel 
arbitration by litigating the original complaint. 
 
4. Release 
 
Another defense to arbitrability is proof that the claims 
that otherwise would be arbitrable have been released by a 
settlement agreement.  In the securities area, claimants may also be 
members of a class action involving claims that arguably are 
related to the arbitration claims.  If the class action has been 
settled, may class members proceed with their related claims in an 
individual capacity in FINRA arbitration? 
 
The Second Circuit in In re American Exp. Fin. Advisors 
Secs. Litig.
79
 addressed this issue.  There, John and Elaine Beland 
brought a FINRA arbitration against Ameriprise and Ronald 
Miller, an Ameriprise Financial Consultant, alleging various 
common law claims stemming from Respondents’ alleged 
mismanagement of the Belands’ account and seeking at least 
$1,500,000 in damages.
80
  Ameriprise answered that the Belands’ 
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claims were no longer arbitrable because they had been released by 
a settlement of a securities class action in the Southern District of 
New York against Ameriprise and other related entities.  That class 
action alleged various federal and common law claims related to 
respondents’ alleged conflicts of interest and misconduct when 
providing financial advice to clients.
81
  The Settlement Agreement 
defined “Released Claims” to explicitly exclude “suitability claims 
unless such claims are alleged to arise out of the common course 
of conduct that was alleged, or could have been alleged.”82  The 
Belands had neither opted out of nor claimed a share in the 
settlement funds of the class action.
83
       
 
After the FINRA arbitration panel denied Respondents’ 
Motion to Stay the arbitration, Respondents moved in the district 
court (before the same court that had retained jurisdiction over the 
class action) to enforce the Settlement Agreement with respect to 
the Belands’ arbitration claims. The district court granted the 
Respondents’ motion and ordered the Belands to withdraw their 
arbitration.
84
 
 
The Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s order, in 
part.  After deciding that the arbitrability of the Belands’ claims 
was a matter for a court, not an arbitrator, to decide, the Second 
Circuit ruled that (1) the Belands were bound by the class action 
settlement agreement; (2) the class action settlement agreement 
modified the parties’ pre-existing agreement to arbitrate pursuant 
to FINRA rules; (3) any of the Belands’ arbitration claims that 
were part of the “Released Claims” in the class action settlement 
were no longer arbitrable; and (4) not all of the Belands’ 
arbitration claims were released by the Settlement Agreement.
85
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Thus, the Belands were permitted to continue with their 
arbitration with respect to unreleased claims – primarily, suitability 
claims.  Notably, the Belands had not specifically delineated in 
their Statement of Claim a claim for “unsuitable 
recommendations.”  However, the Court of Appeals stated that 
“for purposes of this appeal we consider ‘suitability’ to serve more 
as a general description of the character of potential common-law 
claims (such as breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, fraud, 
and negligent misrepresentation—all of which the Belands did 
allege in the FINRA proceedings), rather than a technical term 
denoting a specific type of section 10(b) claim.”86  Moreover, the 
Belands’ suitability claims focused on Respondents’ mismanaging 
their accounts contrary to their instructions and investment goals, 
whereas the “released” suitability claims stem from Respondents’ 
alleged “routine practice of ‘steering American Express clients into 
[proprietary] funds through one or more managed programs at 
American Express.”87  Thus, the Belands’ suitability claims did not 
entirely overlap with the Released Claims, and could be arbitrated. 
 
C. Arbitral Misconduct 
 
1. Arbitrator Immunity 
 
In Sacks v. Dietrich,
88
 the Ninth Circuit held that FINRA 
arbitrators were immune from civil liability when they disqualified 
the plaintiff from being a party representative in a FINRA 
arbitration.  The arbitrators had disqualified the representative 
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under FINRA Rule 13208, which bars non-attorneys who have 
been suspended or barred from the securities industry from 
representing parties in FINRA arbitration.  The purported party 
representative then sued the arbitrators who had signed the 
disqualification order in state court for, inter alia, tortious 
interference with contract.
89
 
 
After the case was removed to federal court, the district 
court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss the case under the 
doctrine of arbitral immunity.
90
  That doctrine provides arbitrators 
with immunity from civil liability for “’acts within their 
jurisdiction arising out of their arbitral functions in contractually 
agreed upon arbitration hearings.’”91  Because the arbitrators 
properly interpreted and applied FINRA Rule 13208, plaintiff’s 
lawsuit was barred. 
 
2. Arbitrator Selection 
  
 In Khan v. Dell,
92
 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals 
resolved a matter of first impression and ruled that FAA § 5
93
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requires a court to appoint a substitute arbitrator when the 
arbitrator designated by the parties’ agreement was not available. 
In that case, a consumer class action against a computer 
manufacturer, the parties’ arbitration agreement had named the 
National Arbitration Forum as the forum to administer arbitrable 
disputes arising out of the agreement.  At the time of the lawsuit, 
the NAF was subject to a consent judgment with the Attorney 
General of Minnesota that barred it from administering consumer 
arbitrations.
94
  In response to Dell’s motion to compel arbitration, 
Khan argued that the designation of NAF as the arbitration forum 
was so integral to the arbitration agreement that the unavailability 
of the NAF should result in non-enforcement of the arbitration 
provision.
95
 
 
 The Third Circuit, acknowledging the issue was one of 
first impression in its circuit, surveyed prior decisions in other 
jurisdictions, and followed the holdings of those courts that 
permitted a court to appoint a substitute arbitrator under FAA § 5 
when the designated one was unavailable rather than voiding the 
arbitration agreement.
96
 
 
3. Evident Partiality 
 Losing parties to arbitration awards can move to vacate the 
award under FAA § 10(a)(2) on the ground of “evident partiality” 
in the arbitrators.  Courts have had difficulty developing a test to 
evaluate whether an arbitrator has demonstrated “evident 
partiality,” since the Supreme Court’s only decision under that 
section is Commonwealth Coatings v. Continental Casualty Co.,
97 
and that case yielded plurality and concurring opinions that are 
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difficult to synthesize.  To evaluate a claim of arbitrator bias, 
courts look to factors such as: 
 
1. the extent and character of the personal interest, pecuniary 
or otherwise, in the proceeding; 
2. the directness of the relationship between the arbitrator 
and the person he is alleged to favor; 
3. the connection of that relationship to the arbitrator; and 
4. the proximity in time between the relationship and the 
arbitration proceeding.
98
 
 
 This past year, the Court of Appeals of New York adopted 
the Second Circuit’s test for “evident partiality.”  In U.S. 
Electronics, Inc. v. Sirius Satellite Radio, Inc.,
99
 the court held that 
“evident partiality ‘will be found where a reasonable person would 
have to conclude that an arbitrator was partial to one party to the 
arbitration.’”100  This “reasonable person” standard requires a 
showing of something more than a mere appearance of bias, but 
not proof of actual bias.
101
  In U.S. Electronics, the Court of 
Appeals declined to vacate the award, stating that “claims of bias, 
premised on attenuated matters and relationships, are not 
sufficient.”102 
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D. Manifest Disregard of the Law 
 
 Since the Supreme Court’s holding in Hall St. Assoc., 
L.L.C.  v. Mattel, Inc.
103
 that parties to an arbitration agreement 
cannot contractually expand the judicial grounds of review of an 
award under the FAA, the circuit courts have split on whether an 
arbitration panel’s “manifest disregard of the law” is a valid 
ground to vacate an arbitration award.  The Supreme Court 
expressly declined to resolve this split in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. 
AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp.104  The circuit split continues, but the 
Tenth Circuit, which previously had expressly declined to address 
the issue, did recognize it as a valid ground in the past year.  
Currently, the circuits stand on this issue as follows: 
 
 The Second, Fourth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits 
acknowledge the continued vitality of the “manifest 
disregard” ground of vacatur.105 
   
 The Fifth, Eighth and Eleventh Circuits have expressly 
ruled that manifest disregard is no longer a valid vacatur 
ground.
106
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 The First Circuit has addressed “manifest disregard” 
subsequent to Hall Street, but only in dicta.
107
 
   
 The Third and Tenth Circuits have expressly 
declined to address the issue.
108
   
 
E. Attorney’s fees 
 
 Two cases this year demonstrate that the courts of appeal 
are more than willing to enforce awards of attorney’s fees.  In one 
case, the Ninth Circuit enforced an attorney’s fees clause in a 
customer agreement against a broker-dealer customer.
109
  In the 
underlying arbitration, Bear Stearns successfully sued Wang to 
recover an unpaid debt.  The district court confirmed the award, 
and awarded Bear Stearns attorney’s fees incurred in confirming 
the award.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Wang’s 
argument that the award of attorney’s fees was improper. 
 
 Similarly, in an industry employment dispute, a panel of 
FINRA arbitrators denied Wachovia’s claims for relief against its 
former broker employees and instead awarded the former 
employees $1.1 million in attorney’s fees under the South Carolina 
Frivolous Civil Proceedings Act.
110
  Wachovia moved to vacate the 
                                                 
107
 See Kashner Davidson Secs. Corp. v. Mscisz, 601 F.3d 19, 21 (1st Cir. 
2010) (acknowledging that the circuit has “not squarely determined 
whether our manifest disregard case law can be reconciled with Hall 
Street”). 
108
 See Rite Aid New Jersey, Inc. v. United Food Commercial Workers 
Union, Local 1360, 449 Fed. Appx. 126, 129 (3d Cir. 2011) (assuming 
without deciding that the manifest disregard standard survived Hall 
Street); Abbott v. Law Office of Patrick J. Mulligan, 440 Fed. Appx. 612, 
620 (10th Cir. 2011) (“in the absence of firm guidance from the Supreme 
Court, we decline to decide whether the manifest disregard standard 
should be entirely jettisoned”).  
109
 Wang v. Bear Stearns & Co., Inc., 2011 WL 5126341 (9
th
 Cir. Oct. 31, 
2011). 
110
 Wachovia Secs., LLC v. Brand, 671 F.3d 472 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 28 
award on numerous grounds, including the contention that the 
panel failed to follow the procedural requirements of the FCPA.   
 
 The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of 
the motion to vacate.  The Court of Appeals held that the panel 
was not required to follow the procedural requirements of the 
FCPA, and, even if it was, its failure to follow them did not 
manifestly disregard the law.
111
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